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[pki] check timestamp chronology during update validation
* Done to address the second "vulnerability" proposed in #1009, independently of the protocol used.
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6 changed files with 253 additions and 8 deletions
73
src/parser.c
73
src/parser.c
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@ -1265,3 +1265,76 @@ char* replace_char(const char* src, const char c, const char* rep)
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res[j] = 0;
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return res;
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}
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static void* get_oid_data_from_asn1_internal(const uint8_t* buf, size_t buf_len, const void* oid,
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size_t oid_len, uint8_t asn1_type, size_t* data_len, BOOL* matched)
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{
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void* ret;
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size_t pos = 0, len, len_len, i;
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uint8_t tag;
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BOOL is_sequence;
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while (pos < buf_len) {
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is_sequence = buf[pos] & 0x20; // Only need to handle the sequence attribute
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tag = buf[pos++] & 0x1F;
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// Compute the length
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len = 0;
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len_len = 1;
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if (tag == 0x05) { // ignore "NULL" tag
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pos++;
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} else {
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if (buf[pos] & 0x80) {
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len_len = buf[pos++] & 0x7F;
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// The data we're dealing with is not expected to ever be larger than 64K
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if (len_len > 2) {
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uprintf("get_oid_data_from_asn1: Length fields larger than 2 bytes are unsupported");
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return NULL;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < len_len; i++) {
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len <<= 8;
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len += buf[pos++];
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}
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} else {
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len = buf[pos++];
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}
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if (len > buf_len - pos) {
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uprintf("get_oid_data_from_asn1: Overflow error (computed length %d is larger than remaining data)", len);
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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if (len != 0) {
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if (is_sequence) {
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ret = get_oid_data_from_asn1_internal(&buf[pos], len, oid, oid_len, asn1_type, data_len, matched);
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if (ret != NULL)
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return ret;
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} else {
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// NB: 0x06 = "OID" tag
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if ((!*matched) && (tag == 0x06) && (len == oid_len) && (memcmp(&buf[pos], oid, oid_len) == 0)) {
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*matched = TRUE;
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} else if ((*matched) && (tag == asn1_type)) {
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*data_len = len;
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return (void*) &buf[pos];
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}
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}
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pos += len;
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}
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};
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Parse an ASN.1 binary buffer and return a pointer to the first instance of OID data of type 'asn1_type',
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* matching the binary OID 'oid' (of size 'oid_len'). If successful, the length or the returned data is
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* placed in 'data_len'.
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* If 'oid' is NULL, the first data element of type 'asn1_type' is returned.
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*/
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void* get_oid_data_from_asn1(const uint8_t* buf, size_t buf_len, const uint8_t* oid, size_t oid_len,
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uint8_t asn1_type, size_t* data_len)
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{
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BOOL matched = (oid == NULL);
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return get_oid_data_from_asn1_internal(buf, buf_len, oid, oid_len, asn1_type, data_len, &matched);
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}
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