Fix bug in user_generate_specific_aes_key, add other read/write le/be funcs

exosphere/src/smc_user.c

@@ -43,16 +43,16 @@ uint32_t user_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint8_t modulus[0x100];
     uint8_t exponent[0x100];
     uint8_t input[0x100];
-    
+
     upage_ref_t page_ref;
-    
+
     /* Validate size. */
     if (args->X[4] == 0 || args->X[4] > 0x100 || (args->X[4] & 3) != 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     size_t exponent_size = (size_t)args->X[4];
-    
+
     void *user_input = (void *)args->X[1];
     void *user_exponent = (void *)args->X[2];
     void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[3];
@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ uint32_t user_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
     }
     if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, exponent, user_exponent, exponent_size) == 0) {
         return 2;
-    }    
+    }
     if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     set_exp_mod_done(false);
     /* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */
     set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, exponent, exponent_size);
     se_exp_mod(0, input, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler);
-    
+
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ uint32_t user_get_random_bytes(smc_args_t *args) {
     if (args->X[1] > 0x38) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     size_t size = (size_t)args->X[1];
-    
+
     flush_dcache_range(random_bytes, random_bytes + size);
     se_generate_random(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_RNGKEY, random_bytes, size);
     flush_dcache_range(random_bytes, random_bytes + size);
-    
+
     memcpy(&args->X[1], random_bytes, size);
     return 0;
 }
@@ -100,36 +100,36 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint8_t kek_source[0x10];
     uint64_t kek[2];
     uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
-    
+
     wrapped_kek[0] = args->X[1];
     wrapped_kek[1] = args->X[2];
-    
+
     unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[3];
-    
+
     if (master_key_rev > 0) {
         master_key_rev -= 1; /* GenerateAesKek offsets by one. */
     }
-    
+
     if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     uint64_t packed_options = args->X[4];
     if (packed_options > 0xFF) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     /* Switched the output based on how the system was booted. */
     uint8_t mask_id = (uint8_t)((packed_options >> 1) & 3);
-    
+
     /* Switches the output based on how it will be used. */
     uint8_t usecase = (uint8_t)((packed_options >> 5) & 3);
-    
+
     /* Switched the output based on whether it should be console unique. */
     bool is_personalized = (int)(packed_options & 1);
-    
+
     bool is_recovery_boot = configitem_is_recovery_boot();
-    
+
     /* Mask 2 is only allowed when booted from recovery. */
     if (mask_id == 2 && !is_recovery_boot) {
         return 2;
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) {
     if (mask_id == 1 && is_recovery_boot) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     /* Masks 0, 3 are allowed all the time. */
-    
+
     const uint8_t kek_seeds[4][0x10] = {
         {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
         {0xA2, 0xAB, 0xBF, 0x9C, 0x92, 0x2F, 0xBB, 0xE3, 0x78, 0x79, 0x9B, 0xC0, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xA5, 0x74},
@@ -153,12 +153,12 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) {
         {0x76, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x34, 0x93, 0x2D, 0xE1, 0x84, 0x24, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x65, 0x55, 0x04, 0x65, 0x81},
         {0xAF, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0xF3, 0x08, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x46, 0xC9, 0x0B}
     };
-    
+
     /* Create kek source. */
     for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) {
         kek_source[i] = kek_seeds[usecase][i] ^ kek_masks[mask_id][i];
     }
-    
+
     unsigned int keyslot;
     if (is_personalized) {
         /* Behavior changed in 4.0.0. */
@@ -174,39 +174,39 @@ uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) {
     } else {
         keyslot = mkey_get_keyslot(master_key_rev);
     }
-    
+
     /* Derive kek. */
     decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, kek_source, 0x10);
     se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, kek, 0x10, wrapped_kek, 0x10);
-    
+
-    
+
     /* Seal kek. */
     seal_key(sealed_kek, 0x10, kek, 0x10, usecase);
-    
+
     args->X[1] = sealed_kek[0];
     args->X[2] = sealed_kek[1];
-    
+
     return 0;
 }
 
 uint32_t user_load_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
     uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
-    
+
     uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1];
     if (keyslot > 3) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     /* Copy keydata */
     sealed_kek[0] = args->X[2];
     sealed_kek[1] = args->X[3];
     wrapped_key[0] = args->X[4];
     wrapped_key[1] = args->X[5];
-    
+
     /* Unseal the kek. */
     unseal_key(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, sealed_kek, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_AES);
-    
+
     /* Unwrap the key. */
     decrypt_data_into_keyslot(keyslot, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, wrapped_key, 0x10);
     return 0;
@@ -234,19 +234,19 @@ uint32_t crypt_aes_done_handler(void) {
 uint32_t user_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint32_t keyslot = args->X[1] & 3;
     uint32_t mode = (args->X[1] >> 4) & 3;
-    
+
     uint64_t iv_ctr[2];
     iv_ctr[0] = args->X[2];
     iv_ctr[1] = args->X[3];
-    
+
     uint32_t in_ll_paddr = (uint32_t)(args->X[4]);
     uint32_t out_ll_paddr = (uint32_t)(args->X[5]);
-    
+
     size_t size = args->X[6];
     if (size & 0xF) {
         generic_panic();
     }
-    
+
     set_crypt_aes_done(false);
 
     uint64_t result = 0;
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ uint32_t user_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args) {
             result = 1;
             break;
     }
-    
+
     return result;
 }
 
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint8_t key[0x10];
     unsigned int master_key_rev;
     bool should_mask;
-    
+
     wrapped_key[0] = args->X[1];
     wrapped_key[1] = args->X[2];
     if (args->X[4] > MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
@@ -288,9 +288,9 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
         return 2;
     }
     should_mask = args->X[3] != 0;
-    
+
     unsigned int keyslot;
-    
+
     /* Behavior changed in 4.0.0. */
     if (mkey_get_revision() >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_400_CURRENT) {
         if (master_key_rev >= 2) {
@@ -301,18 +301,18 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     } else {
         keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY;
     }
-    
+
     if (fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() < 0x7F) {
         /* On dev units, use a fixed "all-zeroes" seed. */
         /* Yes, this data really is all-zero in actual TrustZone .rodata. */
         uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
         uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_ctr[0x10] = {0x3C, 0xD5, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x68, 0x31, 0x4A, 0x06, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x0C, 0xD9, 0xF6, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0xE9};
         uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_mask[0x10] = {0xAC, 0xCA, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x21, 0x1E};
-        
+
         flush_dcache_range(key, key + 0x10);
         se_aes_ctr_crypt(keyslot, key, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_ctr, 0x10);
         flush_dcache_range(key, key + 0x10);
-        
+
         if (should_mask) {
             for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) {
                 key[i] ^= dev_specific_aes_key_mask[i];
@@ -324,10 +324,10 @@ uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
         decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, retail_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10);
         se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, key, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10);
     }
-    
+
-    
+
-    args->X[1] = key[0];
+    args->X[1] = read64le(key, 0);
-    args->X[2] = key[1];
+    args->X[2] = read64le(key, 8);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -335,27 +335,27 @@ uint32_t user_compute_cmac(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1];
     void *user_address = (void *)args->X[2];
     size_t size = (size_t)args->X[3];
-        
+
     uint8_t user_data[0x400];
     uint64_t result_cmac[2];
     upage_ref_t page_ref;
-    
+
     /* Validate keyslot and size. */
     if (keyslot > 3 || args->X[3] > 0x400) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     flush_dcache_range(user_data, user_data + size);
     se_compute_aes_128_cmac(keyslot, result_cmac, 0x10, user_data, size);
-    
+
     /* Copy CMAC out. */
     args->X[1] = result_cmac[0];
     args->X[2] = result_cmac[1];
-    
+
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -363,13 +363,13 @@ uint32_t user_load_rsa_oaep_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
     uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
     bool is_personalized;
-    
+
     uint8_t user_data[0x400];
     void *user_address;
     size_t size;
     upage_ref_t page_ref;
 
-    
+
     /* Copy keydata */
     sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1];
     sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2];
@@ -381,23 +381,23 @@ uint32_t user_load_rsa_oaep_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     size = (size_t)args->X[5];
     wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6];
     wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7];
-    
+
     if (is_personalized && size != 0x240) {
         return 2;
     }
     if (!is_personalized && (size != 0x220 || fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() >= 0x7F)) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     /* Ensure that our private key is 0x100 bytes. */
     if (gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_RSAOAEP, is_personalized) < 0x100) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     memcpy(g_rsa_oaep_exponent, user_data, 0x100);
     return 0;
 }
@@ -406,13 +406,13 @@ uint32_t user_decrypt_rsa_private_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
     uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
     bool is_personalized;
-    
+
     uint8_t user_data[0x400];
     void *user_address;
     size_t size;
     upage_ref_t page_ref;
 
-    
+
     /* Copy keydata */
     sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1];
     sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2];
@@ -424,28 +424,28 @@ uint32_t user_decrypt_rsa_private_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     size = (size_t)args->X[5];
     wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6];
     wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7];
-    
+
     if (size > 0x240) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     if (is_personalized && size < 0x31) {
         return 2;
     }
     if (!is_personalized && (size < 0x11 || fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() >= 0x7F)) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     size_t out_size;
-    
+
     if ((out_size = gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_RSAPRIVATE, is_personalized)) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     if (secure_copy_to_user(&page_ref, user_address, user_data, size) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
@@ -458,13 +458,13 @@ uint32_t user_load_secure_exp_mod_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
     uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
     bool is_personalized;
-    
+
     uint8_t user_data[0x400];
     void *user_address;
     size_t size;
     upage_ref_t page_ref;
 
-    
+
     /* Copy keydata */
     sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1];
     sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2];
@@ -476,41 +476,41 @@ uint32_t user_load_secure_exp_mod_key(smc_args_t *args) {
     size = (size_t)args->X[5];
     wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6];
     wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7];
-    
+
     if (is_personalized && size != 0x130) {
         return 2;
     }
     if (!is_personalized && (size != 0x110 || fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() >= 0x7F)) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     size_t out_size;
-    
+
     /* Ensure that our key is non-zero bytes. */
     if ((out_size = gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_SECUREEXPMOD, is_personalized)) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     /* Copy key to global. */
     if (out_size <= 0x100) {
         memcpy(g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, user_data, out_size);
     } else {
         memcpy(g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, user_data, 0x100);
     }
-    
+
     return 0;
 }
 
 uint32_t user_secure_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint8_t modulus[0x100];
     uint8_t input[0x100];
-    
+
     upage_ref_t page_ref;
-            
+
     void *user_input = (void *)args->X[1];
     void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[2];
 
@@ -524,25 +524,25 @@ uint32_t user_secure_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
     if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     set_exp_mod_done(false);
     /* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */
     set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, 0x100);
     se_exp_mod(0, input, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler);
-    
+
     return 0;
 }
 
 uint32_t user_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint8_t modulus[0x100];
     uint8_t wrapped_key[0x100];
-    
+
     upage_ref_t page_ref;
-            
+
     void *user_wrapped_key = (void *)args->X[1];
     void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[2];
     unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[7];
-    
+
     if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
         return 2;
     }
@@ -557,34 +557,34 @@ uint32_t user_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
     if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     set_exp_mod_done(false);
-    
+
     /* Expected label_hash occupies args->X[3] to args->X[6]. */
     tkey_set_expected_label_hash(&args->X[3]);
-    
+
     tkey_set_master_key_rev(master_key_rev);
-    
+
     /* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */
     set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, g_rsa_oaep_exponent, 0x100);
     se_exp_mod(0, wrapped_key, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler);
-    
+
     return 0;
 
 }
 
 uint32_t user_load_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint64_t sealed_titlekey[2];
-    
+
     uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1];
     if (keyslot > 3) {
         return 2;
     }
-    
+
     /* Copy keydata */
     sealed_titlekey[0] = args->X[2];
     sealed_titlekey[1] = args->X[3];
-    
+
     /* Unseal the key. */
     unseal_titlekey(keyslot, sealed_titlekey, 0x10);
     return 0;
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ uint32_t user_unwrap_aes_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
     uint64_t aes_wrapped_titlekey[2];
     uint8_t titlekey[0x10];
     uint64_t sealed_titlekey[2];
-    
+
     aes_wrapped_titlekey[0] = args->X[1];
     aes_wrapped_titlekey[1] = args->X[2];
     unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[3];

exosphere/src/titlekey.c

@@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ void calculate_mgf1_and_xor(void *masked, size_t masked_size, const void *seed,
     if (seed_size >= 0xE0) {
         generic_panic();
     }
-    
+
     size_t hash_buf_size = seed_size + 4;
     memcpy(hash_buf, seed, seed_size);
-    
+
-    uint32_t round = 0;
+    uint32_t round_num = 0;
-    
+
     uint8_t *p_out = (uint8_t *)masked;
 
     while (masked_size) {
@@ -45,21 +45,17 @@ void calculate_mgf1_and_xor(void *masked, size_t masked_size, const void *seed,
         if (cur_size > 0x20) {
             cur_size = 0x20;
         }
-        
+
-        hash_buf[seed_size + 0] = (uint8_t)((round >> 24) & 0xFF);
+        write32be(hash_buf, seed_size, round_num++);
-        hash_buf[seed_size + 1] = (uint8_t)((round >> 16) & 0xFF);
-        hash_buf[seed_size + 2] = (uint8_t)((round >> 8) & 0xFF);
-        hash_buf[seed_size + 3] = (uint8_t)((round >> 0) & 0xFF);
-        round++;
 
         flush_dcache_range(hash_buf, hash_buf + hash_buf_size);
         se_calculate_sha256(cur_hash, hash_buf, hash_buf_size);
-        
+
         for (unsigned int i = 0; i < cur_size; i++) {
             *p_out ^= cur_hash[i];
             p_out++;
         }
-        
+
         masked_size -= cur_size;
     }
 }
@@ -68,7 +64,7 @@ size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_si
     if (src_size != 0x100) {
         generic_panic();
     }
-    
+
     /* RSA Wrapped titlekeys use RSA-OAEP. */
     /* Message is of the form prefix || maskedSalt || maskedDB. */
     /* maskedSalt = salt ^ MGF1(maskedDB) */
@@ -77,43 +73,43 @@ size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_si
     /* DB is of the form label_hash || 00....01 || wrapped_titlekey. */
     /* label_hash is, in practice, a constant in es .rodata. */
     /* I have no idea why Nintendo did this, it should be either nonconstant (in tik) or in tz .rodata. */
-    
+
     uint8_t *message = (uint8_t *)src;
-    
+
     /* Prefix should always be zero. */
     if (*message != 0) {
         return 0;
     }
 
-    
+
     uint8_t *salt = message + 1;
     uint8_t *db = message + 0x21;
-    
+
     /* This will be passed to smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey. */
     uint8_t *expected_label_hash = (uint8_t *)(&g_tkey_expected_label_hash[0]);
-    
+
     /* Unmask the salt. */
     calculate_mgf1_and_xor(salt, 0x20, db, 0xDF);
     /* Unmask the DB. */
     calculate_mgf1_and_xor(db, 0xDF, salt, 0x20);
-    
+
     /* Validate expected salt. */
     for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x20; i++) {
         if (expected_label_hash[i] != db[i]) {
             return 0;
         }
     }
-    
+
     /* Don't validate salt from message[1:0x21] at all. */
-    
+
     /* Advance pointer to DB, since we've validated the salt prefix. */
     db += 0x20;
-    
+
     /* DB must be of the form 0000...01 || wrapped_titlekey */
     if (*db != 0) {
         return 0;
     }
-    
+
     /* Locate wrapped_titlekey inside DB. */
     size_t wrapped_key_offset_in_db = 0;
     while (wrapped_key_offset_in_db < 0xBF) {
@@ -127,13 +123,13 @@ size_t tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, void *src, size_t src_si
             return 0;
         }
     }
-    
+
     /* Validate size... */
     size_t wrapped_titlekey_size = 0xBF - wrapped_key_offset_in_db;
     if (wrapped_titlekey_size > dst_size || wrapped_titlekey_size == 0) {
         return 0;
     }
-    
+
     /* Extract the wrapped key. */
     memcpy(dst, &db[wrapped_key_offset_in_db], wrapped_titlekey_size);
     return wrapped_key_offset_in_db;
@@ -143,15 +139,15 @@ void tkey_aes_unwrap(void *dst, size_t dst_size, const void *src, size_t src_siz
     if (g_tkey_master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX || dst_size != 0x10 || src_size != 0x10) {
         generic_panic();
     }
-    
+
     const uint8_t titlekek_source[0x10] = {
        0x1E, 0xDC, 0x7B, 0x3B, 0x60, 0xE6, 0xB4, 0xD8, 0x78, 0xB8, 0x17, 0x15, 0x98, 0x5E, 0x62, 0x9B
     };
-    
+
     /* Generate the appropriate titlekek into keyslot 9. */
     unsigned int master_keyslot = mkey_get_keyslot(g_tkey_master_key_rev);
     decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, master_keyslot, titlekek_source, 0x10);
-    
+
     /* Unwrap the titlekey using the titlekek. */
     se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, dst, 0x10, src, 0x10);
 }

exosphere/src/utils.h

@@ -78,6 +78,26 @@ static inline uint64_t read64le(const volatile void *qword, size_t offset) {
     return *(uint64_t *)((uintptr_t)qword + offset);
 }
 
+static inline uint32_t read64be(const volatile void *qword, size_t offset) {
+    return __builtin_bswap64(read64le(qword, offset));
+}
+
+static inline void write32le(volatile void *dword, size_t offset, uint32_t value) {
+    *(uint32_t *)((uintptr_t)dword + offset) = value;
+}
+
+static inline void write32be(volatile void *dword, size_t offset, uint32_t value) {
+    write32le(dword, offset, __builtin_bswap32(value));
+}
+
+static inline void write64le(volatile void *qword, size_t offset, uint64_t value) {
+    *(uint64_t *)((uintptr_t)qword + offset) = value;
+}
+
+static inline void write64be(volatile void *qword, size_t offset, uint64_t value) {
+    write64le(qword, offset, __builtin_bswap64(value));
+}
+
 static inline unsigned int get_core_id(void) {
     uint64_t core_id;
     __asm__ __volatile__ ("mrs %0, mpidr_el1" : "=r"(core_id));